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Epistemic interpretations of quantum theory maintain that quantum states only represent incom-
plete information about the physical states of the world. A major motivation for this view is the
promise to provide a reasonable account of state update under measurement by asserting that it
is simply a natural feature of updating incomplete statistical information. Here we demonstrate
that all known epistemic ontological models of quantum theory in dimension d ≥ 3, including those
designed to evade the conclusion of the PBR theorem, cannot represent state update correctly. Con-
versely, interpretations for which the wavefunction is real evade such restrictions despite remaining
subject to long-standing criticism regarding physical discontinuity, indeterminism and the ambiguity
of the Heisenberg cut. This revives the possibility of a no-go theorem with no additional assump-
tions, and demonstrates that what is usually thought of as a strength of epistemic interpretations
may in fact be a weakness.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many interpretations of quantum theory1.
Among the many differences between these interpreta-
tions, one that often takes center stage is the stance that
they take towards the wavefunction or quantum state.
Three broad categories have been identified which cap-
ture a number of interpretations. Two of these categories
are more commonly juxtaposed: ontic interpretations [1–
14] posit that the quantum state is a part of the real
(physical) state of a system, whereas epistemic interpre-
tations [15–23] argue that the quantum state is merely a
state of knowledge about the real state of the system. A
very thorough review of these two stances can be found
in [24]. A third recently articulated category of doxas-
tic interpretations [25–31] argue that the quantum state
is a state of belief, and are distinguished from epistemic
interpretations by the fact that they deny that a system
has some ‘real state.’ While not all interpretations con-
form to these three descriptors, they are useful categories
insofar as they allow us to qualitatively discuss certain
features separately from the particular interpretation in
which they are embedded.
The epistemic class has garnered attention as a view
which provides very appealing explanations of otherwise
paradoxical features of quantum theory like the state up-
date rule [17], the classical limit under quantum chaos
[20], no cloning [32], and entanglement [33]. For exam-
ple, through this viewpoint state update is not a physical
‘collapse’ process and therefore not subject to paradoxes,
indeterminism, and discontinuity; rather it is understood
as analogous to the non-pardoxical ‘collapse’ of a subjec-
∗ jbruebeck@uwaterloo.ca
1 This is an understatement.
tive probability distribution via Bayes’ rule upon con-
sideration of new information. While several epistemic
models have been proposed [16, 22, 34–38], they gener-
ally have undesirable features or are restricted to a sub-
theory of full quantum theory. None achieve all of the
features that an optimistic epistemicist would expect.
This suggests the possibility that a fully satisfactory
epistemic interpretation cannot actually explain all of
quantum theory despite the qualitatively compelling fea-
tures of such a view2. This suspicion has led to a num-
ber of no-go theorems in recent years which establish
that, given at least one additional assumption, any con-
sistent interpretation of quantum theory cannot be epis-
temic [36, 40–43]. These no-go theorems are generally
proven within the ontological models formalism, which
describes a large class of existing interpretations of quan-
tum theory [21, 44, 45].
Within the ontological models formalism, epistemic
models can be given a precise mathematical definition
called the ψ-epistemic criterion [22]. This precise crite-
rion allows the possibility of conclusively ruling out this
type of model. Outside of this framework, it is unlikely
that ψ-epistemic models can be precluded with any kind
of certainty; doxastic interpretations, for example, do not
fit neatly into the ontological models framework and thus
are not necessarily ruled out by these no-go theorems.
This is despite the fact that they share many of the fea-
tures which make ψ-epistemic interpretations appealing.
In the present paper we restrict our attention to the on-
tological models framework.
2 As is well-known, the work of Bell [39] has shown that no epis-
temic interpretation can evade the non-locality that manifests
trivially in ontic interpretations; this trivial manifestation of non-
locality in ontic interpretations is an oft-forgotten insight from
Einstein [15, 18, 23].
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
08
21
8v
2 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
1 M
ar 
20
19
2The fact that an extra assumption is required to rule
out ψ-epistemic theories has purportedly been demon-
strated by the existence of ψ-epistemic models which,
while being individually unsatisfactory for various rea-
sons, do satisfy at least the bare minimum requirements
of a ψ-epistemic theory [35–37]. All of these models were
specified within a prepare-measure framework, so they
have been proven to reproduce quantum statistics for all
experiments that involve preparing a state and then mea-
suring it once. In this paper we show that, if we allow
sequential measurements in the operational description,
these models cannot reproduce operational statistics.
Our main contribution in this work is thus to demon-
strate that the state update rule imposes severe con-
straints on ψ-epistemic models. This is in contrast to the
prevailing view that, as articulated by Liefer, “a straight-
forward resolution of the collapse of the wavefunction,
the measurement problem, Schro¨dingers cat and friends
is one of the main advantages of ψ-epistemic interpreta-
tions” [24]. As a consequence, we revive the possibility
of a general no-go theorem for ψ-epistemic models that
doesn’t rely on an additional assumption such as the lo-
cality assumption required in [40] which conflicts with the
non-locality that is implied by Bell’s theorem [43, 46].
Although state update under measurement has been
described in a few specific models [22, 34, 47, 48] and
discussed with regards to contextuality [49], it has yet to
be treated generally or in relation to the ψ-epistemic/ψ-
ontic distinction3. Here we take some preliminary steps
in both of these directions, and argue that ψ-epistemic
models are the natural arena in which to investigate in-
teresting behavior of state update under measurement.
In Section II, we describe the ontological models for-
malism, adding a description of state update under mea-
surement and motivating its importance. Despite this
motivation, one might still argue that many distinctly
quantum phenomena (e.g. Bell inequality violations) can
be described without reference to state update; thus,
from an operationalist point of view, we shouldn’t need
to consider state update in order to investigate these phe-
nomena. However, we show in Section III that the con-
sideration of state update actually places nontrivial re-
strictions on how one can represent even a prepare-and-
measure-once experiment. Thus our results are directly
applicable to models which have only specified behavior
for a single measurement. Section IV reviews a number
of examples of ontological models from the literature; in
each case we either specify its state update rule (in di-
mension d = 2 and for ψ-ontic models) or prove its impos-
sibility (for all known ψ-epistemic models in dimension
d ≥ 3). Finally, we discuss the implications of our results
and describe some open questions in Section V.
3 Although the Leggett-Garg inequalities [50, 51] might be con-
strued as a general treatment of state update, it is more accurate
to say that they are about the absence of state update.
II. DEFINING MEASUREMENT UPDATE IN
ONTOLOGICAL MODELS
A. The ontological models formalism
In the standard treatment, an operational theory [44]
is described by a set of preparations P, a set of transfor-
mations T , and a set of measurements M along with a
probability distribution
Pr(k|M,T, P ). (1)
This quantity describes the probability of some measure-
ment outcome k ∈ Z given an experimenter’s choice of
P ∈ P, T ∈ T , and M ∈M. When considering transfor-
mations this is called the prepare-transform-measure op-
erational framework, and when we omit transformations
it is the prepare-measure framework. Often we take P to
be the set of pure quantum state preparations, T to be
the full set unitary maps on a Hilbert space, andM to be
all projective measurements on this Hilbert space. In this
case, we say we are describing the full quantum theory4;
in contrast, a subtheory is described by taking subsets
of P, T ,M for the full quantum theory. For example,
in quantum information settings we often consider only
measurements in the standard basis.
Note that this standard definition involves a single
measurement and a single measurement outcome de-
spite the fact many important quantum experiments (e.g.
Stern-Gerlach, double slit [52]) and quantum algorithms
(e.g. measurement-based error correction [53]) involve
multiple measurements. Thus we will refer to the usual
definition of prepare-measure as prepare-and-measure-
once experiments. In this paper, we are concerned with
multiple measurements, so we will also have to describe
probabilities like
Pr(k2, k1|M2,M1, P ). (2)
Additionally, we note that positive operator valued
measures (POVMs) do not fully specify how a measure-
ment updates a state. Although one can obtain a POVM
{Ek} from a set of generalized measurement operators
{Mk} by the relation Ek = M†kMk, the decomposition
of {Ek} into {Mk} is not unique. Thus although M is
often described by POVMs, consideration of state up-
date requires that we specify generalized measurement
operators instead. As an example of when this is im-
portant, consider a coarse-graining of the measurement
{Mk} = {[0], [1], [2]}, where we denote the projector
onto a state
[ψ] = |ψ〉〈ψ| (3)
4 Larger sets can be considered (e.g. including mixed states, CPTP
maps, or non-projective measurements), but all of the models
studied in this paper fit the given definition.
3as in [24]. We can either coarse-grain coherently, i.e.
measure {M ′k} = {[0]+[1], [2]} or we can coarse-grain de-
coherently by measuring {Mk} and then combining out-
comes 0 and 1 into a single measurement result and ‘for-
getting’ which one actually occurred. While these two
processes are represented by the same POVM {Ek} =
{[0] + [1], [2]}, their state update behavior is different:
if the state 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) is measured, it will stay the
same in the coherent case or update to the mixed state
1
2 ([0] + [1]) in the decoherent case.
An ontological model [21, 44, 45] supplements this op-
erational point of view by asserting that a system has
a state λ, called an ontic state. To specify an ontologi-
cal model, we first choose an ontic state space Λ. Then,
preparations are described by a preparation distribution
µ(λ|P ), which is the probability of preparing some state
λ ∈ Λ given the preparation P . Transformations are de-
scribed by a transition matrix Γ(λ′|λ, T ), which is the
probability of preparing a new state λ′ given the pre-
vious state λ and the choice T of transformation. Fi-
nally, measurements are represented by a response func-
tion ξ(k|λ,M) which describes the probability of an out-
come k given the ontic state λ and the choice of measure-
ment M . We say that an ontological model successfully
reproduces quantum theory if∫
Λ
dλ′
∫
Λ
dλ ξ(k|λ′,M)Γ(λ′|λ, T )µ(λ|P )
= PrQ(k|M,T, P ) (4)
∀P ∈ P, T ∈ T ,M ∈M,
or, in a prepare-and-measure-once experiment,∫
Λ
dλ ξ(k|λ,M)µ(λ|P ) = PrQ(k|M,P ) (5)
∀P ∈ P,M ∈M.
In both of these cases, PrQ indicates the outcome prob-
ability calculated by operational quantum theory for the
particular experiment under consideration.
Again, we must supplement this definition in order to
model repeated measurement. In textbook quantum the-
ory, the state updates during a measurement in a way
that depends on the previous state, the measurement
procedure, and the measurement outcome. We allow for
dependence on all of these things by choosing to repre-
sent this via a state update rule η(λ′|k, λ,M). Although
this object looks very similar to the transition matrix for
transformations, it is distinguished by two important fea-
tures which we emphasize by choosing a new symbol to
represent it.
The first distinction is simple, in that η depends on a
measurement outcome k, while Γ does not; this is anal-
ogous to the fact that generally in quantum theory we
can only implement measurement update maps proba-
bilistically (i.e. by post-selecting on a not-necessarily-
deterministic measurement outcome).
The second distinction is the fact that η(λ′|k, λ,M) is
not defined for all λ ∈ Λ. Roughly speaking, it doesn’t
make sense to ask “What is the new state λ′ after an
outcome k?” if the outcome k could not have occurred
given the previous state λ. To express this formally, we
define the support of a distribution
Supp(ξ(k|·)) = {λ ∈ Λ : ξ(k|λ) > 0} (6)
as the set of ontic states on which it is nonzero. Using
this, we can say that η(λ′|k, λ,M) is well-defined only for
λ ∈ Supp(ξ(k|·)). This fact is central to the main result
of this paper; by showing that η is non-normalizable on
some domain, we are able to conclude that that domain
cannot be part of the support of ξ. This property of
η is analogous to the fact that while post-selected state
update maps are completely positive (CP) in quantum
theory, they have a nontrivial kernel and so are not trace-
preserving (TP).
The consistency condition with quantum theory is
given by equations similar to Eqs. 4 and 5; see Ap-
pendix A for more formal treatments of the properties
of η and other extensions of the ontological models for-
malism discussed so far. The rigorous treatment in the
appendix requires drawing on the stochastic processes
and hidden Markov models literature, which addition-
ally provides insight into the basic assumptions of the
ontological models formalism itself.
This paper is not explicitly concerned with contextu-
ality [16, 44], but we are careful to ensure that we do not
assume noncontextuality. Under the definition of gener-
alized contextuality given in [44], an ontological model
is noncontextual if two operationally equivalent prepa-
ration, transformation, or measurement procedures are
always represented by equivalent preparation distribu-
tions, transition matrices, or response functions, respec-
tively5. It is contextual otherwise. While this generalized
definition may be too broad, accounting for contextual-
ity under this definition also accounts for the traditional
definition [16], and is therefore more inclusive. Although,
as stated above, we do not assume noncontextuality of
any kind, most of our results hold for a projector in-
dependent of its full measurement context. We are ex-
plicit about this when it is the case, and write ξ(Π|λ)
rather than ξ(k = 0|λ,M = {Π, . . .}) for notational con-
venience; η(λ′|λ,Π) is defined similarly.
B. ψ-epistemic models
Here we focus on a set of precise criteria for epistemic
interpretations within the ontological models formalism.
Consider first the ψ-epistemic criterion, proposed in [23]
as a test for whether an interpretation admits at least
some quantum states that are not uniquely determined
by the underlying state of reality. Following [49], we
5 This definition is actually complicated slightly by the inclusion
of repeated measurements, but we do not discuss this here.
4account for potential preparation noncontextuality by
defining
∆ψ =
⋃
Pψ∈Pψ
Supp(µ(·|Pψ)) (7)
where Pψ ⊆ P is the set consisting of every possible
preparation of |ψ〉. We refer to ∆ψ as the support of a
state |ψ〉, to distinguish it from the support of a particu-
lar preparation Pψ. Then a pair of states |ψ〉 , |φ〉 is on-
tologically distinct in a particular model if ∆φ ∩∆ψ = ∅,
and ontologically indistinct otherwise6. This leads us
to the standard definition of a ψ-epistemic ontological
model [23, 24]:
Definition 1 (ψ-epistemic). An ontological model is ψ-
epistemic if there exists a pair of states |ψ〉 , |φ〉 that are
ontologically indistinct; i.e. ∃ |ψ〉 , |φ〉 : ∆φ ∩∆ψ 6= ∅.
As noted in [24], this definition is highly permissive in
the sense that, if an ontological model were to contain
only a single pair of quantum states that are ontolog-
ically indistinct, then it would not achieve the full ex-
planatory power expected of the ψ-epistemic viewpoint;
this is exactly the case with the ABCL0 model discussed
in Section IV B 4.
There are, however, proposals to strengthen the no-
tion of ψ-epistemicity, two of which are relevant to our
discussion [24, 54].
Definition 2 (Pairwise ψ-epistemic). An ontological
model is pairwise ψ-epistemic if, for all pairs |ψ〉 , |φ〉 of
nonorthogonal quantum states, |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are ontologi-
cally indistinct.
Definition 3 (Never ψ-ontic). An ontological model is
never ψ-ontic if every ontic state λ ∈ Λ is in the support
of at least two quantum states:
∀λ ∈ Λ : ∃ψ, φ : λ ∈ ∆ψ ∩∆φ. (8)
Note that both of these definitions imply the weaker
notion of ψ-epistemicity, but are independent from one
another.
C. Some easy cases of state update rules
There are two cases in which, given a prepare-and-
measure-once ontological model for quantum theory, we
6 For this purposes of this paper we assume there exists a mea-
sure that is absolutely continuous to all other measures in the
ontological model. Therefore, we can work with probability den-
sities, rather than the full measure-theoretic treatment. While
this assumption is not strictly true in all of our models, it does
not affect our results.
can always augment it with a state update rule for mea-
surement. First, if we only include rank-1 projective mea-
surements in the subtheory we’re modeling, we can sim-
ply re-prepare in the measured (unique, pure) state:
η(λ′|k, λ,M{Πi}) = µ(λ′|PΠk) for tr(Πk) = 1. (9)
This is normalized for all λ since µ is normalized, and
faithfully reproduces quantum statistics since µ does. It
is independent of the previous state λ, which, besides
being unsatisfying, is also not possible in general (this
follows from Section III).
Second, it is quick to prove, again by construction, that
ψ-ontic models can always be given a state update rule.
Since there is a unique quantum state |ψλ〉 associated
with every ontic state λ, we can define
η(λ′|k, λ,M) = µ
λ′∣∣∣∣P = Mk[ψλ]M†k
tr
(
Mk[ψλ]M
†
k
)
. (10)
Again, normalization and faithfulness follow because µ
has these properties. Note that this construction works
for any kind of measurement, not just projective mea-
surements.
These observations together suggest that in order
to find anything interesting involving state update,
we ought to examine higher-rank measurements in ψ-
epistemic theories. This suspicion will be confirmed by
the main result of this paper, which applies to exactly
these types of measurements.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF STATE UPDATE
We now prove our central claim that consideration of
a rule for state update under measurement has conse-
quences for the response function of an ontological model,
so that consistent state update puts restrictions on how
one may represent even a prepare-and-measure-once ex-
periment. We begin with a lemma that articulates a gen-
eral property of the update rule η, and then examine its
consequences for response functions ξ.
Lemma 1. Suppose we have an ontological model with
ontic space Λ, preparation distributions µ(λ|P ), indicator
functions ξ(k|λ,M), and state update maps η(λ′|k, λ,M).
For a particular ontic state λ and measurement projector
Π, we define the set Sλ,Π of quantum states that one could
obtain after measurement of any quantum state consis-
tent with λ:
Sλ,Π =
{
Π |φ〉√ 〈φ|Π|φ〉
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀ |φ〉 : λ ∈ ∆φ
}
. (11)
It is then true that, independently of the measurement
context of Π,
Supp(η(·|λ,Π)) ⊆
⋂
|ψ〉∈Sλ,Π
∆ψ. (12)
5Proof. Suppose that measuring a state |φ〉 with a mea-
surement M results in the updated state |ψ〉 when we get
outcome k, where Π is the kth projector in M . Then let
PM,k,Pφ ∈ Pψ be the preparation procedure associated
with post-selection of this measurement outcome after a
particular preparation Pφ. It must be normalized on ∆ψ:
1 =
∫
∆ψ
dλ′ µ(λ′|PM,k,Pφ)
=
∫
∆ψ
dλ′
∫
∆φ
dλ η(λ′|k, λ,M)µ(λ|Pφ)
=
∫
∆φ
dλµ(λ|Pφ)
∫
∆ψ
dλ′ η(λ′|k, λ,M)
Since η is always positive, normalization of µ(λ|Pφ) then
implies that∫
∆ψ
dλ′ η(λ′|k, λ,M) = 1 ∀λ ∈ ∆φ.
If η is normalized on a region, its support must be con-
tained in that region. Thus for all λ that are consistent
with some preparation |φ〉 that could result in the post-
measurement state |ψ〉,
Supp(η(·|k, λ,M)) ⊆ ∆ψ.
The fact that this is true for all |ψ〉 that could result from
the measurement leads to Eq. 12.
We note that Lemma 1 is easy to account for in ψ-
ontic theories and for rank-1 measurements, since in both
cases Sλ,Π has a single element. This is why we were
able to write down update rules for these situations in
Section II C. Outside of these trivial cases, Eq. (12) is
a very restrictive condition; depending on the structure
of Sλ,Π, the intersection may be a very small set. In
particular, if any two of the post-selected quantum states
are orthogonal, then Sλ,Π is empty.
Theorem 1 (Main theorem). Suppose that a projector
Π maps two states |α〉 , |β〉 to ontologically distinct states
Π |α〉 ,Π |β〉. Then the response function for Π cannot
have support on the overlap of |α〉 , |β〉 for any measure-
ment context of Π; i.e.
∆Π|α〉∩∆Π|β〉 = ∅ =⇒ ξ(Π|λ) = 0 ∀λ ∈ ∆α∩∆β . (13)
Proof. Pick some λ ∈ ∆α ∩ ∆β . By Lemma 1,
Supp(η(·|λ,Π)) = ∅ so η(λ′|λ,Π) is not normalizable.
As discussed in Section II A, this is only allowable if
ξ(Π|λ) = 0.
Both the lemma and the theorem hold for non-
projective measurements as well. We emphasize that
this result does not say anything directly about the over-
lap of the supports of quantum states, just their overlap
within the support of a particular response function. In
the following section, we deploy this theorem by show-
ing that, in every known ψ-epistemic model for d ≥ 3,
measurements of this type exist and have support on the
relevant overlaps, leading to contradiction and demon-
strating that these models cannot reproduce state update
under measurement.
IV. EXAMPLES OF STATE UPDATE UNDER
MEASUREMENT (OR ITS IMPOSSIBILITY)
We provide a number of examples of ontological models
from the literature, illustrating some of the properties
described in the previous sections. For each model, we
either specify its state update rule or prove that it cannot
reproduce state update. Although many of these models
can be easily defined for arbitrary types of measurements,
we only consider projective measurements for simplicity
and notational consistency.
A. ψ-epistemic models of a qubit
1. Kochen-Specker model
The Kochen-Specker model of a qubit [16, 24] is an
exemplar of what we look for in a ψ-epistemic theory,
with the unfortunate feature that it only works in d = 2
dimensions. It is both pairwise ψ-epistemic and never ψ-
ontic, and provides a very intuitively pleasing interpreta-
tion of the statistical nature of quantum theory. We take
the ontic space to be the unit sphere S2, and denote by
~ψ the Bloch vector corresponding to |ψ〉 under the usual
mapping. Preparations and measurement outcomes are
represented by distributions over hemispheres, with re-
sponse functions uniform and preparation distributions
peaked towards the center (Fig. 1a). Unitary transfor-
mations are represented by rotations of the sphere. Since
the only nontrivial measurements on a qubit are rank-1
measurements, this is a case where we can use the state
update rule described in Eq. 9 and just re-prepare the
measured state for our update rule:
Λ = S2
µ(~λ|Pψ) = 1
pi
Θ(~ψ · ~λ)~ψ · ~λ
Γ(~λ′|~λ, TU ) = δ(~λ′ −RU~λ)
ξ(k|~λ,Mφ) = Θ(k~φ · ~λ)
η(~λ′|k,~λ,Mφ) = 1
pi
Θ(k~φ · ~λ′)k~φ · ~λ′ (14)
Here Θ is the Heaviside step function, RU is the rotation
of the Bloch sphere corresponding to a unitary U , and
k ∈ {+1,−1}. This particular state update rule is not
particularly satisfactory in an explanatory sense, since it
is independent of the previous ontic state.
6(a) Kochen-Specker model (b) Montina model (c) Beltrametti-Bugajski
model
(d) Bell Model
Figure 1: Visualizations of the state space, preparation distributions, and response functions for (a) the
Kochen-Specker model, (b) Montina’s model, (c) the Beltrametti-Bugajski model for d = 2, and (d) Bell’s model for
d = 2. Blue represents the support of preparations, and green the support of the response functions, where possible.
Black objects are generic elements of the state space.
2. Montina model
In [34], Montina introduces an ontological model based
on the Kochen-Specker model. The model was con-
structed to show that state update in a qubit can be
successfully modeled by only updating a finite amount of
information in the ontic state. To do so, Montina extends
the ontic space of the Kochen-Specker model by taking
two vectors ~x+1, ~x−1 on the Bloch sphere and adding
two bits, labeled r and s, such that the vectors on the
Bloch sphere are dynamic under transformations but re-
main static under measurement update (Fig. 1b). The
bit r ∈ {−1,+1} acts as an index which decides which of
the two Bloch vectors is ‘active;’ s ∈ {−1,+1} stores the
result of a hypothetical standard basis measurement on
the state. We take the standard basis to be defined by a
special vector ~n pointing along the z-axis.
As in the Kochen-Specker model, unitary transforma-
tions act by rotating the Bloch vectors; additionally, if
the vector ~xr (i.e. the ‘active’ Bloch vector) crosses the
horizontal equator of the sphere during this transforma-
tion, then the bit s flips to −s. r does not change during
a transformation.
A measurement in the standard basis simply reveals
the value of s, and then updates r so that the active
vector is the one which was more closely aligned with ~n at
the time of measurement. For any other basis, we apply
the unitary that maps our desired measurement basis to
the standard basis, measure, and then rotate back—this
whole process has been wrapped into our definitions of η
and ξ below. In either case, the vectors ~x+1, ~x−1 do not
change during measurement.
Finally, we prepare a state ~ψ by measuring in the basis
{~ψ,−~ψ} and applying a rotation that maps −~ψ → ~ψ if
we measured −~ψ. Summarizing these constructions, we
can write
Λ = S2 × S2 × {−1,+1} × {−1,+1}
λ = (~x+1, ~x−1, r, s)
µ(λ|Pψ) = 1
(4pi)2
Θ
[
s
(
~xr · ~ψ
)
(~xr · ~n)
]
·Θ
[
r
[(
~x+1 · ~ψ
)2
−
(
~x−1 · ~ψ
)2]]
Γ(λ′|λ, TU ) = δ
(
~x′+1 −RU~x+1
)
δ
(
~x′−1 −RU~x−1
)
·Θ [ss′ (~x′r · ~n) (~xr · ~n)] Θ[rr′]
ξ(k|λ,Mφ) = Θ
[
ks (~xr · ~n)
(
~xr · ~φ
)]
η(λ′|k, λ,Mφ) = δ
(
~x′+1 − ~x+1
)
δ
(
~x′−1 − ~x−1
)
·Θ
[
ss′(~xr · ~n)
(
~xr · ~φ
)
(~xr′ · ~n)
(
~xr′ · ~φ
)]
·Θ
[
r′
[(
~x+1 · ~φ
)2
−
(
~x−1 · ~φ
)2]]
(15)
The original presentation is not stated in terms of the
ontological models formalism, and only explicitly models
measurements in the standard basis. This lead to the
claim that state update under measurement is accounted
for by updating a single bit, but it is clear from the form
of η above that by including all measurements in our
subtheory we have caused both bits to be updated during
measurement.
We include this model here for two reasons. First, it
7is one of the few ontological models in the literature that
has explicitly considered state update under measure-
ment. Second, it demonstrates that the generic rank-
1 update (Eq. 9) that we used for the Kochen-Specker
model is not the only possibility; even though all mea-
surements in this model are rank-1, η has nontrivial de-
pendence on the previous ontic state λ. Thus just be-
cause we can construct a trivial update rule in some cases
does not mean that there is then nothing interesting to
investigate. It also includes these features while remain-
ing pairwise ψ-epistemic and never ψ-ontic.
B. Models of full quantum theory for arbitrary
dimension
1. Beltrametti-Bugajski model
The Beltrametti-Bugajski model [9, 24] is perhaps the
simplest ontological model that describes a system of ar-
bitrary dimension. Although it is ψ-ontic, it is the start-
ing point for the construction of the next three models
in this section. For a d-dimensional quantum system,
we take the ontic space to be the quantum state space,
which we denote PHd−1 (the projective Hilbert space of
dimension d − 1). Preparations, transformations, mea-
surements, and state update rules then follow directly
from the usual quantum rules:
Λ = PHd−1
µ(λ|Pψ) = δ(|λ〉 − |ψ〉)
Γ(λ′|λ, TU ) = δ(|λ′〉 − U |λ〉)
ξ(k|λ,M{Πi}) = 〈λ|Πk |λ〉
η(λ′|k, λ,M{Πi}) = δ
(
|λ′〉 − Πk |λ〉√〈λ|Πk |λ〉
)
(16)
This provides an example of the generic update-rule for
ψ-ontic models (Eq. 10), and is depicted in Fig. 1c.
2. Bell’s model
Lewis et al. [35] extended a model of a qubit orignally
proposed by Bell [39] to arbitrary dimension, which can
be seen as a modification of the Beltrametti-Bugajski
model [24]. The ontic space is the Cartesian product of
the projective Hilbert space with the unit interval [0, 1].
Now we write λ as an ordered pair λ = (|λ〉 , pλ) where
|λ〉 ∈ PHd−1, as in the Beltrametti-Bugajski model, and
pλ ∈ [0, 1]. Preparations remain essentially the same,
becoming a product distribution of a delta function on
the quantum state space with a uniform distribution over
the unit interval. The response functions divide up the
unit interval into lengths corresponding to probabilities
of measuring each outcome, and respond with outcome k
when pλ is in the corresponding interval (Fig. 1d). This
has the effect of making the model outcome determinis-
tic.
Λ = PHd−1 × [0, 1]
µ(λ|Pψ) = δ(|λ〉 − |ψ〉)
Γ(λ′|λ, TU ) = δ(|λ′〉 − U |λ〉)
ξ(k|λ,M{Πi}) = Θ
pλ − k−1∑
j=0
tr(Πj[λ])

·Θ
−pλ + k∑
j=0
tr(Πj[λ])

η(λ′|k, λ,M{Πi}) = δ
(
|λ′〉 − Πk |λ〉√〈λ|Πk |λ〉
)
(17)
Since this model is still ψ-ontic, we once again use the
generic state update rule for ψ-ontic models. In this case,
we can also see that this works because of the structure
of the preparations as product distributions. Since ev-
ery state has a uniform distribution over pλ, and this is
uncorrelated with |λ〉, we don’t need to update any infor-
mation about pλ and so can just re-use the Beltrametti-
Bugajski model update rule.
3. LJBR model
In [35], Lewis et al. define a ψ-epistemic model based
on their generalization of Bell’s model. Referred to here
as the LJBR model, it is motivated by the observation
that the order of segments in the response function of
Bell’s model does not matter: a re-ordering of these seg-
ments allows arbitrary modification of preparation dis-
tributions within a subset of the ontic space, so they can
be made to overlap. We present here a brief description
of the ‘most epistemic’ version of this model, and refer
the reader to [35] for a more thorough construction and
motivation.
The LJBR model has the same ontic space as the Bell
model, so we again write ontic states as λ = (|λ〉 , pλ). It
is constructed in a preferred basis {|j〉}, which we use in
defining two helper functions. First,
zj(|λ〉) = inf|φ〉:tr([j][φ])≥1/d tr([λ][φ]). (18)
Note that zj(|λ〉) > 0 if and only if tr([j][λ]) > d−1d ,
so zj(|λ〉) is nonzero for at most a single element of the
preferred basis; we denote this unique vector as |jλ〉. Sec-
ond, we define a permutation piM,λ for each measurement
M and ontic state λ:
tr
(
MpiM,λ(0)[jλ]
) ≥ tr(MpiM,λ(1)[jλ]) ≥ · · ·
· · · ≥ tr(MpiM,λ(|M |−1)[jλ]). (19)
If there is no |jλ〉, i.e. zj(|λ〉) = 0 for all j, then we take
piM,λ to be the identity permutation. The final element
8we need before defining the model itself is a set
Ej = {λ : zj(|λ〉) > 0} (20)
defined for each basis vector. Without further ado, the
full specification of the model:
Λ = PHd−1 × [0, 1]
λ = (|λ〉 , pλ)
µ(λ|Pψ) = δ(|λ〉 − |ψ〉)
∏
j
Θ[pλ − zj(|ψ〉)]
+
∑
j
zj(|ψ〉)µEj (λ)
ξ(k|λ,M{Πi}) = Θ
[
pλ −
k−1∑
l=0
tr
(
ΠpiM,λ(l)[λ]
)]
·Θ
[
−pλ +
k∑
l=0
tr
(
ΠpiM,λ(l)[λ]
)]
(21)
where µEj (λ) is the uniform distribution over Ej .
Roughly, all quantum states |ψ〉 with tr([j][ψ]) > d−1d
will have support on Ej , and so will all overlap with each
other. The permutation included in the definition of the
measurements is constructed so that this shared support
does not affect the prepare-and-measure-once statistics:
the measurement ordered first by the permutation has a
support which entirely contains Ej . This model is not
pairwise ψ-epistemic, nor is it never ψ-ontic. Note ad-
ditionally that it was originally only defined for rank-1
projective measurements, but it works just as well for
higher-rank projective measurements without modifica-
tion.
This model is the first to fall to Theorem 1:
Theorem 2. The LJBR model cannot represent state
update under measurement in dimension d ≥ 3.
Proof. The general idea of the proof is to find a measure-
ment which maps any two nonidentical states |α〉 , |β〉
to two again nonidentical states Π |α〉 ,Π |β〉 which both
have no support on any of the Ej , and so are ontologically
distinct.
Consider the preferred basis |j〉 of the LJBR model
and the generalized x-basis defined by
|Xk〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ωjk |j〉 , ω = e2pii/d. (22)
These x-basis states have the property tr([Xj][k]) =
1
d
for all j, k. There must exist two elements |Xk1〉 , |Xk2〉
of the x-basis such that |α〉 , |β〉 differ on that two-
dimensional subspace or else |α〉 , |β〉 would be identi-
cal. Pick two such elements, and consider the projec-
tor Π = [Xk1 ] + [Xk2 ]. The quantum overlap of the
post-measurement state Π |α〉 with any basis vector |j〉
is, using the submultiplicativity of the trace,
tr([j]Π[α]Π)
tr(Π[α])
≤ tr([j]Π) = 2
d
≤ d− 1
d
(23)
and the same is true for Π |β〉. As described above,
only states with tr([j][ψ]) > d−1d have overlap with any
other states in the LJBR model, so the post-measurement
states are ontologically distinct; by Theorem 1, ξ(Π|λ) =
0 for all λ ∈ Ej for all j since |α〉 and |β〉 were arbitrary.
However, when measured in the context of the rest of
the rank-1 x-basis projectors, Π will be ordered first by
piM,λ for all λ since
tr(Π[j]) =
2
d
>
1
d
(24)
for all j. Thus, by the construction of the LJBR model,
ξ(Π|λ) = 1 for all λ ∈ Ej , resulting in a contradiction.
4. ABCL models
In [36], Aaronson et. al. construct two ψ-epistemic
models. The first, which we will call ABCL0 , is very
closely related to the LJBR model but is not identi-
cal; rather than continuous regions of quantum states
which overlap, this model has exactly one pair of quan-
tum states which are ontologically indistinct. However,
it gains the feature that any two nonorthogonal quan-
tum states can be chosen as the single pair that overlaps.
With malice aforethought, we will call this defining pair
|α〉 , |β〉.
The second, ABCL1 , is a convex mixture (to be de-
fined) of the ABCL0 model constructed for all |α〉 , |β〉
and is intended to demonstrate the possibility of a pair-
wise ψ-epistemic model. This is the only known example
of a pairwise ψ-epistemic model in d ≥ 3, but it still
is not never ψ-ontic [24, 54]. These models have come
under criticism for their “unnaturalness,” but we show
here that their problems go deeper due to an inability to
represent state-update.
We begin with ABCL0 , defining a couple of helper
functions like in the LJBR model. Rather than order-
ing measurements with respect to traces with a preferred
basis, we use the defining states |α〉 , |β〉 and a function
gαβ(Π) = min{tr(Π[α]), tr(Π[β])}. (25)
We now define a new permutation σM
7 for each measure-
ment M [24]:
gαβ(MσM (0)) ≥ gαβ(MσM (1)) ≥ · · · ≥ gαβ(MσM (|M |−1)).
(26)
7 To be precise, we should label this with α, β as well to emphasize
that it belongs to the model defined by that particular pair of
states.
9With this, we can specify the ABCL0 model.
Λ = PHd−1 × [0, 1]
λ = (|λ〉 , pλ)
µ(λ|Pψ) =

[
Θ(pλ − ε)δ(|λ〉 − |ψ〉)
+
1
2
Θ(ε− pλ)[δ(|λ〉 − |α〉) + δ(|λ〉 − |β〉)]
]
if |ψ〉 = |α〉 , |β〉
δ(|λ〉 − |ψ〉) otherwise
ξ(k|λ,M{Πi}) = Θ
pλ − k−1∑
j=0
tr
(
ΠσM (j)[λ]
)
·Θ
−pλ + k∑
j=0
tr
(
ΠσM (j)[λ]
) (27)
for ε ≤ |〈α|β〉|d . Now the preparation distributions for|α〉 and |β〉 overlap on {|α〉 , |β〉} × [0, ε]; as in the LJBR
model, the permutation in ξ ensures that the prepara-
tion change doesn’t affect the prepare-and-measure-once
statistics by making sure measurements whose support
must contain this overlap region are ordered first. Once
again, this model fails to meet the conditions required in
order to faithfully represent state update:
Theorem 3. The ABCL0 model cannot represent state
update under measurement in dimension d ≥ 3.
Proof. Call the two states defining the model |α〉 , |β〉.
Let Π = [α] + [γ], where |γ〉 is some state such that
〈α|γ〉 6= 0 and 0 < |〈γ|β〉|2 < 1− |〈α|β〉|2. (28)
Under this measurement, |α〉 maps to |α〉 and |β〉 does
not get mapped to either |α〉 or |β〉. Thus the post-
measurement states are ontologically distinct, so by The-
orem 1, ξ(Π|λ) = 0 for all λ ∈ ∆α ∩∆β .
For the other half of the contradiction, note that
tr(Π[α]) = 1 means gαβ(Π) = tr(Π[β]) > 0 (since |α〉 , |β〉
are nonorthogonal) and gαβ(I−Π) = 1−tr(Π[α]) = 0, so
Π is ordered first by σM when measured in the context
M = {Π, I − Π}. Thus ξ(Π|λ) = 1 for all λ ∈ ∆α ∩∆β ,
resulting in a contradiction.
We outline the ABCL1 model schematically and refer
the reader to [24, 36] for details. Given two ontological
models specified by Λ1, µ1, ξ1 and Λ2, µ2, ξ2 respectively,
the authors define a convex combination of these models
as Λ3, µ3, ξ3 such that
Λ3 = Λ1 ⊕ Λ2
µ3 = pµ1 + (1− p)µ2
ξ3 = ξ1 + ξ2 (29)
Here p ∈ (0, 1) is some mixing parameter. If there’s over-
lap between two states in either of models 1 or 2, then
model 3 has overlap on these states. The ABCL1 model
is then defined essentially as a convex mixture of the
ABCL0 models for all pairs |α〉 , |β〉, taking care with
respect to the uncountable size of this set.
In order to include state update in a convex combina-
tion of ontological models, the most obvious (and perhaps
only) option is to specify
η3 = η1 + η2. (30)
The failure of the ABCL1 model to reproduce state
update follows directly from the failure of the ABCL0
model.
Theorem 4. The ABCL1 model cannot represent state
update under measurement in dimension d ≥ 3
Proof. When we take a convex combination of models,
we see that
Supp(ξ3(k|·,M)) =Supp(ξ1(k|·,M)) ∪ Supp(ξ2(k|·,M))
Supp(η3(·|k, λ,M)) = Supp(η1(·|k, λ,M))
∪ Supp(η2(·|k, λ,M))
Thus if either of models 1 or 2 violates Theorem 1, model
3 must violate it as well. Since all of the ABCL0 models
being mixed violate Theorem 1, so must ABCL1 .
5. A note on transformations
As Leifer notes, transformations also play a role in re-
stricting the structure of ψ-epistemic ontological mod-
els [24, Section 8.1]. If an ontological model successfully
represents all unitary transformations, then |〈ψ|φ〉| =
|〈ψ′|φ′〉| implies that |ψ〉 , |φ〉 are ontologically distinct
if and only if |ψ′〉 , |φ′〉 are ontologically distinct. If
the model also includes all CPTP maps, then |〈ψ|φ〉| ≥
|〈ψ′|φ′〉| implies that |ψ′〉 , |φ′〉 are ontologically distinct
if |ψ〉 , |φ〉 are.
It immediately follows that the LJBR and ABCL0
models cannot faithfully represent unitary transforma-
tions. In each model there exist quantum states which
are ontologically distinct from every other state; pick one
of these states, and it is easy to find examples of pairs of
ontologically distinct states with any inner product.
However, transformations cannot necessarily rule out
the ABCL1 model: since it is pairwise ψ-epistemic,
the unitary condition could in principle be satisfied.
That said, the transformation rule would be compli-
cated because it would have to map between models that
are mixed together, so it is certainly an open question
whether this is actually possible.
C. Models of subtheories
Although we have dealt so far with models that in-
clude the full quantum set of preparations, transforma-
tions, and measurements, there is the possibility that we
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can retain ψ-epistemic models of subtheories. It turns
out that although the stabilizer subtheory can be repre-
sented by a ψ-epistemic model, the more general Kitchen
Sink model which models any finite subtheory cannot in
general represent state update under measurement.
1. Kitchen Sink model
The Kitchen Sink model is a ψ-epistemic ontolog-
ical model for any finite subtheory of quantum the-
ory [37, Section IIIC]. Given a finite set of projective
measurementsM = {M (i)}, we choose our ontic states to
be a list of measurement outcomes λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λ|M|).
That is, λi = k means that if M
(i) = {Π(i)j } is measured
on the ontic state λ, the outcome Πk will occur with
certainty. For a system of dimension d, the maximum
number of projectors in any given measurement is d, so
we pad all of our measurements with 0s until they have
d elements. The Kitchen Sink model is then defined by
Λ = Z|M|d
µ(λ|ψ) =
|M|∏
i=1
tr
(
Π
(i)
λi
[ψ]
)
ξ(k|λ,M (i)) = δ(k, λi) (31)
The Kitchen Sink is pairwise ψ-epistemic for any subthe-
ory, and also never ψ-ontic if we include all pure states
in our subtheory. Transformations can additionally be
modeled under the assumption of a closed subtheory.
We can only rule out the Kitchen Sink model for cer-
tain subtheories, as it is easy to construct subtheories
with trivial update rules (e.g. by only including rank-1
measurements). That said, our requirements are few and
are satisfied by the multi-qupit stabilizer subtheory, ar-
guably the most important subtheory of quantum theory.
Specifically, we only need to include two states |α〉 , |β〉
and two measurementsM (1) = {Π, I−Π},M (2) satisfying
〈α|β〉 6= 0 (32)
〈α|Π|α〉 6= 0 (33)
〈β|Π|β〉 6= 0 (34)
M (2) distinguishes Π |α〉 and Π |β〉 (35)
The first is required because we don’t expect orthogonal
states to be ontologically indistinguishable. The next two
stipulate that there is a nonzero chance of obtaining an
outcome Π when measuring |α〉 and |β〉, so that its sup-
port overlaps with their support. The last condition im-
plies that the post-measurement states are ontologically
distinct [24].
Theorem 5. For any finite subtheory containing states
and measurements satisfying the conditions given in
Eqs. 32–35, the Kitchen sink model cannot model state
update under measurement.
Proof. Theorem 1 implies that, if Π maps |α〉 , |β〉 to on-
tologically distinct states, then∫
Λ
dλ ξ(Π|λ)µ(λ|α)µ(λ|β) = 0. (36)
We evaluate this quantity for the Kitchen Sink’s response
functions and preparation distributions, using the states
and measurement M (1) satisfying Eqs. 32–35:∫
Λ
dλ ξ(k = 0|λ,M (1))µ(λ|α)µ(λ|β)
=
∑
λ∈Z|M|r
δ(0, λ1)
|M|∏
j=1
tr
(
M
(j)
λj
[α]
)
tr
(
M
(j)
λj
[β]
)
=
∑
λ1∈Zr
δ(0, λ1) tr
(
M
(1)
λ1
[α]
)
tr
(
M
(1)
λ1
[β]
)
·
|M|∏
j=2
∑
l∈Zr
tr
(
M
(j)
l [α]
)
tr
(
M
(j)
l [β]
)
= tr
(
M
(1)
0 [α]
)
tr
(
M
(1)
0 [β]
)
·
|M|∏
j=2
∑
l∈Zr
tr
(
M
(j)
l [α]
)
tr
(
M
(j)
l [β]
)
(37)
This final expression will be zero if and only if at least
one of its factors is 0. The first two factors are nonzero by
Eqs. 33 and 34. The rest of the factors are nonzero due to
Eq. 32 and the completeness condition on the measure-
ments. Thus Eq. 37 is nonzero and we have a contradic-
tion, so state update cannot be represented faithfully.
This demonstrates that Theorem 1 can create trouble
even in subtheories. In particular, the stabilizer subthe-
ory satisfies the requirements in Eqs. 32–35, so it cannot
be modeled by the Kitchen Sink. That said, we can show
that the stabilizer subtheory still supports a ψ-epistemic
interpretation using other models.
2. Qupit stabilizer subtheory
We begin with the straightforward case of n p-
dimensional systems, for p an odd prime. In this case,
the stabilizer subtheory has an ontological model given
by the discrete Wigner function [33, 55] (see Appendix B
for definitions of the stabilizer subtheory and the phase-
point operaters Aλ):
Λ = Znp × Znp
µ(λ|Pψ) = 1
pn
tr(Aλ[ψ])
ξ(k|λ,M{Πi}) = tr(ΠkAλ) (38)
As the Wigner function is a quasi-probability distribu-
tion [56], it necessarily takes on negative values if we
try to model the full quantum theory. If, however, we
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restrict to modeling preparations, transformations, and
measurements in the qupit stabilizer subtheory, then the
representation is positive and it forms a well-defined on-
tological model [33, 57]. It is both pairwise ψ-epistemic
and never ψ-ontic.
The stabilizer subtheory presents a challenge in that
measuring a single qupit is described by a rank-pn−1 mea-
surement, which may run into trouble due to Theorem 1.
In particular, there are many examples in the stabilizer
subtheory of the type of measurements that broke the
Kitchen Sink model. Nonetheless, we can specify the up-
date rule
η(λ′|k, λ,M{Πi}) =
1
pn
tr(AλΠkAλ′Πk)
tr(ΠkAλ)
. (39)
Note the normalization factor in η which makes clear that
η is only defined in the support of ξ. The fact that this
successfully reproduces quantum statistics follows from
the fact that post-selected measurement is a completely
positive map, and this is how completely positive maps
are represented in quasi-probability representations [56].
η is always positive for the stabilizer subtheory, though
we do not include the proof here.
For the case p = 2, Lillystone and Emerson construct
a ψ-epistemic model of the n-qubit stabilizer formalism
that successfully represents state update under measure-
ment [48]. This model starts from the Kitchen Sink
model and augments Λ so that the problematic over-
laps of the Kitchen sink are removed. This model is
not pairwise ψ-epistemic, but a modified version (see ap-
pendix of [48]) is never-ψ-ontic. We don’t present the
construction here because it is significantly more convo-
luted than the model above for p ≥ 3. This reflects the
often-observed ill-behaved nature of the qubit stabilizer
subtheory.
Tangentially, if we extend the Wigner function to the
full quantum theory, we get negatively represented state
update, as expected. One consequence of this is that
some state updates can’t be normalized, so the Wigner
function state update must include a renormalization
step not allowed in ontological models or quasiprobabil-
ity representations. Although further discussion of state
update under measurement in quasi-probability represen-
tations is beyond the scope of this paper, we note that
Theorem 1 does not hold for quasi-probability represen-
tations so this could be one potential direction for related
future work.
V. DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated that state update under mea-
surement poses a serious challenge to ψ-epistemic inter-
pretations of quantum theory in the ontological models
framework: all currently known ψ-epistemic models for
full quantum theory in d ≥ 3 cannot faithfully represent
state update. This runs in direct contrast to the prevail-
ing view that ψ-epistemic models provide a compelling
explanation of state update.
There are a number of remaining open questions.
Most pressingly, we have re-opened the possibility of
proving a general ψ-onticity result without additional
assumptions—will the methods of this paper be useful
in doing so?
On the one hand, the proofs above do not rule out the
possibility of extending the ontology of the broken models
in order to represent state update under measurement
while still retaining the epistemicity of the model. This
is exactly the route taken in [48] for the n-qubit stabilizer
subtheory. Granted, the n-qubit stabilizer subtheory was
brought within an inch of ψ-onticity by this process, so
it seems unlikely that a similar technique will work for
the full quantum theory.
In the other direction, we’ve shown that consideration
of state update puts powerful constraints on the structure
of ψ-epistemic models. These restrictions would ideally
lead to a categorical statement like “ψ-epistemic mod-
els cannot represent state-update,” but there are chal-
lenges to achieving this conclusion. In particular, we note
that all of the ψ-epistemic models that we considered
share the property of outcome determinism, which means
that Theorem 1 may be less trouble in non-outcome-
deterministic models. At the very least, any no-go theo-
rem will have to include measurements, states, and/or
transformations from outside the stabilizer subtheory
since we have shown that ψ-epistemic models for this
subtheory exist.
What import does our result have for the general inter-
pretational project of quantum theory? First of all, we
have demonstrated that ψ-epistemicists have yet another
challenge to overcome: a successful explanation of state-
update. This is in contrast with the usual claim that
this arena is one where epistemic interpretations have an
advantage over ontic interpretations. As we emphasized
in the introduction, our results only strictly apply to in-
terpretations that can be described by the ontological
models formalism, but there may be a qualitative mes-
sage for epistemic and doxastic interpretations that are
outside this formalism as well.
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Appendix A: Ontological models as hidden Markov
models of stochastic channels
In the context of state update under measurement, it is
illuminating to motivate the definition of an ontological
model from the point of view of the hidden Markov mod-
els (HMM) literature. We do this in order to (a) provide
a rigorous treatment of multiple-measurement scenarios
presented informally in Section II A and (b) clarify the
assumptions that define the ontological models frame-
work.
We picture a quantum circuit as a memoryful stochas-
tic channel (Fig. 2). The channel that we often discuss
with regards to a quantum circuit is the (quantum) chan-
nel that takes the input quantum state and maps it to
the output quantum state. For present purposes, we will
instead think of it as a channel from the experimenter
to individual measurement outcomes used repeatedly at
each time step. Pictorially, one might think of this as ‘ro-
tating the channel ninety degrees’ in a circuit diagram.
The input string ←→a0 = . . . a−2a−1a0a1a2 . . . of the
channel is the experimenter’s choice of action, which we
take to be an operational preparation, transformation,
or measurement procedure. The output string
←→
k0 of
the channel reports either the results of measurements
or a trivial output for preparations and transformations.
The subscript 0 indicates in both cases the time that
we take as an origin/reference point. The channel is
then described by the conditional probability distribu-
tion Pr(
←→
k0 |←→a0 ). Following [58], we denote substrings
with at:t+L = atat+1 . . . at+L−1, and also define the past←−at = a−∞:t and future −→at = at:∞. We can now define
two properties of stochastic channels:
Definition 4 (Stationary). A stationary channel is one
that has time-translation symmetry, so statistics are not
k k′
P
U
M
U ′′
M ′
U ′
k0 = 0
a0 = P
k1 = 0
a1 = U
k2 = 0
a2 = U
′
k3 = k
a3 = M
k4 = 0
a4 = U
′′
k5 = k
′
a5 = M
′
ch
a
n
n
e
l
Figure 2: A quantum circuit can be pictured as a
stochastic channel, as described in the text. The inputs
to the channel at are the choice of operation, and the
outputs kt report the results of measurements.
affected by our choice of time-origin:
Pr(kt:t+L|←→at ) = Pr(k0:L|←→ao ) and
Pr(
←→
kt |←→at ) = Pr(←→k0 |←→a0 ) ∀t, L,←→a . (A1)
Definition 5 (Causal). A causal channel is one for
which a finite output substring depends only on input
symbols in its past:
Pr(kt:t+L|←→a ) = Pr(kt:t+L|←−a t+L). ∀t, L,←−a (A2)
It is shown in [58] that a channel satisfying these two
properties can be specified entirely by the single-symbol
recurrence relation
Pr(k0|a0,←−a0,←−k0). (A3)
Note that this does not imply a Markov process, since
it depends in general on the entire histories ←−a0 and ←−k0.
All we mean by single-symbol is that we are not specify-
ing the probabilities over the whole future, just a single
output symbol. We now construct an HMM as follows:
Definition 6 (Hidden Markov Model). A hidden
Markov model (HMM) of a stationary, causal channel is
specified by an additional random variable λ taking values
in a state space Λ. It is given a joint probability distribu-
tion over
←→
λ0 ,
←→a0 ,←→k0 so that the recurrence relation above
(Eq. A3) becomes
Pr(k0, λ1|a0, λ0,←−a 0,←−k 0,←−λ 0) = Pr(k0, λ1|a0, λ0). (A4)
In other words, the state λ renders the future condi-
tionally independent of the past and induces a Markov
process over the state space Λ that mediates the chan-
nel statistics. An influence diagram [59] of a stationary,
causal channel is shown in Figure 3 before and after the
specification of an HMM.
To see that specification of an HMM as in Eq. A4 is
equivalent to the definition of an ontological model given
in Section II A, we first note that generally we don’t think
of preparations and transformations having output; to
account for this, we stipulate that they give a trivial,
deterministic output k0 = 0. We then factor the prob-
ability distribution from Eq. A4 and look separately at
the cases where a0 is a preparation, transformation, or
measurement:
Pr(k0, λ1|λ0, a0)
= Pr(λ1|k0, λ0, a0)Pr(k0|λ0, a0)
=

µ(λ1|P )δk0,0 a0 = P ∈ P
Γ(λ1|λ0, T )δk0,0 a0 = T ∈ T
η(λ1|k0, λ0,M)ξ(k0|λ0,M) a0 = M ∈M
(A5)
where δ is the Kronecker delta. The state update map
η emerges naturally from this perspective of a quantum
experiment as a stochastic process, and here we see an-
other reason why it is only defined in the support of ξ. If
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(b) A hidden Markov model of the above channel
Figure 3: Influence diagrams [59] for stochastic
channels. The boxes represent choices made by the
experimenter, circles represent random variables, and
arrows represent a possible causal influence. Note that
no arrows point backwards in time, and that in the
hidden Markov model the state λt mediates all causal
influences through time.
we take the joint distribution Pr(k0, λ1|λ0, a0) to be the
more fundamental object, then it is clear we can obtain
ξ directly by marginalization
ξ(k0|λ0,M) =
∫
Λ
dλ1 Pr(k0, λ1|λ0,M) (A6)
which is always well defined, and then find η by rearrang-
ing Eq. A5:
η(λ1|k0, λ0,M) = Pr(k0, λ1|λ0,M)
ξ(k0|λ0,M) (A7)
Thus clearly η(λ1|k0, λ0,M) is only well-defined when
ξ(k0|λ0,M) 6= 0.
Definitions 4–6 constitute an equivalent formulation
of the ontological models formalism. The assumptions
of this construction can be broken down as follows: (a)
quantum theory is described by a stochastic channel, (b)
this channel is stationary, (c) it is causal, and (d) we as-
sign the system a state which acts as an HMM of the
channel. The authors of [60] identify (c) and (d), calling
them non-retrocausality and λ-mediation, respectively.
Appendix B: A brief introduction to the stabilizer
subtheory
We focus here on the stabilizer subtheory for n qupits,
where p is a prime. For a more detailed exposition, we
refer the reader to [33, 55].
a. Mathematical objects The generalizations of the
X and Z operators to a single qupit are defined by their
action on the standard basis {|j〉} for j = 0, 1, . . . , p− 1:
X |j〉 = |j + 1〉 (B1)
Z |j〉 = ωj |j〉 (B2)
ω = e2pii/p (B3)
All integer arithmetic is done mod p. Then the full set of
generalized Pauli operators on n qupits is given by
T(x,z) =
{⊗n−1
j=0 X
xjZzj p = 2⊗n−1
j=0 ω
xjzj/2XxjZzj p > 2
(B4)
for x = (x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) ∈ Znp
and z = (z0, z1, . . . , zn−1) ∈ Znp
We also define the symplectic inner product as
[(x, z), (x′, z′)] = z · x′ − x · z′. (B5)
Finally, the phase-point operators Aλ, for λ = (x, z) ∈
Znp ×Znp , are a symplectic Fourier transform of the Pauli
operators:
Aλ =
1
pn
∑
λ′∈Znp×Znp
ω[λ,λ
′]Tλ′ (B6)
b. The stabilizer subtheory A stabilizer group S is
a set of pn mutually commuting Pauli operators, which
can be specified by a set of n generators. There is a
unique state (up to global phase) which is an eigenvector
of all of these operators with eigenvalue +1; we say that
S stabilizes this state. For example, for two qubits, the
Bell state
|Ψ〉 = |00〉+ |11〉 (B7)
is stabilized by
SΨ = 〈Z1Z2, X1X2〉 (B8)
= {I, Z1Z2, X1X2,−Y1Y2}. (B9)
Here a subscript indicates on which qubit the operator
is acting, e.g. Z1 = Z ⊗ I describes Z acting on the
first qubit. A stabilizer state, then, is a state which is
stabilized by a group of pn Pauli operators.
Stabilizer measurements are simply measurements of
the Pauli operators. Note that since each Pauli opera-
tor has p eigenvalues, these amount to a measurement of
p projectors, each with rank pn−1. Lower-rank projec-
tors can be constructed by performing commuting Pauli
measurements sequentially.
Finally, the transformations of the stabilizer subtheory
are called Clifford transformations. These are the trans-
formations that map the set of Pauli operators to itself,
up to a global phase. In other words, it is the normalizer
of the Pauli group.
The stabilizer subtheory thus consists of preparations
corresponding the set of stabilizer states, measurements
of Pauli observables, and Clifford transformations, along
with convex combinations thereof.
